K-Monitor has sued the Prime Minister's Office to make public which government decisions are classified as "state secrets." The case is currently before the court and the National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information. However, it is quite possible that Minister Antal Rogán, heading the Prime Minister’s Office, will decide the matter.

In early summer 2025, K-Monitor filed a lawsuit against the Prime Minister's Office for refusing to release the list of so-called "3000-series government resolutions" that were adopted in recent years.

What are the "3000-series resolutions"?

The 3000-series resolutions are government resolutions, i.e., decisions, that contain classified information, formerly known as "state secrets." These resolutions do not appear in the Hungarian Official Gazette or anywhere else publicly.

The "three thousand" designation refers to the numbering of resolutions: resolutions containing classified information always start with the number 3000. In contrast, "1000-series resolutions" are "ordinary" government resolutions published in the Hungarian Official Gazette, numbered starting with 1000. "2000-series resolutions" do not contain state secrets but are also not published in the Official Gazette - their numbering starts with 2000. Finally, there are 4000-series resolutions, about which relatively little is known because the government does not publish these either.

Who decides whether a resolution is secret or public?

The Government decides on the publicity of all resolutions, thus the Government determines whether it wants to make its decisions known to the public. Therefore, if the Government believes it is better politically to keep certain government measures secret, they simply do not assign a 1000-series number to the decision, thereby avoiding publication in the Hungarian Official Gazette.

Is it possible to know what resolutions the Government has adopted?

Even though certain government resolutions are not public, K-Monitor believes that the titles of government resolutions should nevertheless be made public. This would at least allow people to know which topics the Government has made decisions on.. However, the Government likely does not want this and does not publish a list of resolutions adopted in secret on any of its platforms. Thus, citizens can only learn about decisions published in the Hungarian Official Gazette or those that government officials may reference in statements.

What does the law say about government resolutions?

There are not many legal provisions for those trying to understand on what basis and how the Government handles its decisions secretly.

According to the law on government administration, the original copy of the summary of government meetings and its annexes, including government resolutions, are kept by the Prime Minister's Office. If they contain classified information, the Prime Minister's Office sends them directly to those concerned, meaning the government resolution does not even  "circulate" within the central administration; only those specifically authorized can access it.

Rules exist only for "1000-series" government resolutions. According to the Ministry of Justice decree about the Hungarian Official Gazette, these must be published publicly.

The law does not determine on what basis a decision becomes a 1000-series, 2000-series, 3000-series, or 4000-series government resolution. Moreover, beyond "1000-series" government resolutions, there is no trace of the seriality of other government resolutions in the legislation

What could be known about government resolutions so far?

So far, the most information has been revealed about the 2000-series resolutions, thanks to journalistic and CSOs’ freedom of information requests.

After HVG.hu journalist Tibor Lengyel won a lawsuit against the ministry, he showed the diverse topics the Government conceals behind 2000-series resolutions.

Thanks to a freedom of information request by Transparency International Hungary, it was also revealed that the number of 2000-series resolutions has been steadily increasing over the past 15 years:

Thanks to K-Monitor's 2023 litigation, it became clear that the public-interest asset management foundations (“KEKVA”s - semi-private foundations under private law but performing public tasks, often led by government politicians and loyalists that have received significant public assets, including universities, from the Government) receive money from the government through 2000-series, meaning non-public resolutions. As a result of K-Monitor's lawsuit, it was revealed that intensive consultations take place between the management foundations and the Government, resulting in billions of Forints moving in the budget even when budgetary adjustments and spending cuts are needed.

Classified Government Resolutions by Year, 2010–2024

Source: Tibor Lengyel, HVG.hu

However, as regards 3000-series resolutions containing “state secrets,” so far only their quantity has been made known, likewise thanks to data requests submitted by Tibor Lengyel.

K-Monitor is suing for government resolutions containing state secrets

To learn more about the “3000-series” resolutions containing “state secrets”, K-Monitor submitted a data request to the Prime Minister’s Office in February 2025. In the request, K-Monitor asked the Office to send the designations of the government resolutions adopted by the Government between 2019 and 2022.

The information required in the designation of a government resolution is also defined by the Ministry of Justice decree about the Official Gazette. According to this, the designation of a government resolution contains:

• the indication of the body making the decision, in this case, the Government,
• the serial number of the resolution and the year of its publication,
• the title of the resolution, i.e., the subject matter by which it can be recognized what the resolution is about.

These were, therefore, the pieces of information K-Monitor requested from the Prime Minister’s Office.

In response to K-Monitor's request, the Prime Minister's Office first extended the response time, then refused to send the data on the grounds that not only the text of government resolutions, but even their designation is classified as a "state secret."

Since K-Monitor believes that at least the designation of government resolutions should be public, it launched a lawsuit against the Office.

The secret paths of secrecy oversight

In the lawsuit, the Prime Minister's Office maintained its position that even the designation of government resolutions is classified data. Therefore, the court suspended the case, and turned to the National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (NAIH) to conduct a so-called secrecy oversight procedure (in the law: “authority procedure for the supervision of data classification”) .

If the classification of a public interest data is contested, NAIH is authorized to decide on its lawfulness, generally within 90 days. This is where the case currently stands, awaiting NAIH's decision.

If NAIH decides that the classification is unlawful, but the Government disagrees with NAIH's decision, the case may continue in court. However, not in the court where the lawsuit was initiated, but in another, so-called administrative court. Until this administrative lawsuit is concluded, the suspended lawsuit initiated by the data requester cannot proceed. This means that if a data requester encounters classified data, it can take years for a decision to be made regarding their data request.

Moreover, the secrecy oversight procedure is not even necessarily effective, as NAIH does know all the information necessary to examine the lawfulness of a classification. In such cases, NAIH can ask the competent minister to examine whether the classification was appropriate. This essentially means that the classifier themselves can judge whether they or their subordinate body acted lawfully.

In its 2019 annual report, NAIH also flagged this legal contradiction :

"If (...) the court (...) initiates the Authority's secrecy oversight procedure, and then in the secrecy oversight administrative procedure, the Authority must rely solely on the opinion of the minister with competence regarding the data (who may be the classifier themselves, or the classifier's superior, or otherwise a person interested in maintaining the classification) to determine in its decision whether the classification of the data was lawful, that can legitimately raise the issue of unnecessary and disproportionate restriction of the data requester's right to a fair procedure."

NAIH's findings were also confirmed by a 2021 study conducted at the Authority's request.

In the case of Hüttl v. Hungary, the European Court of Human Rights ruled, for similar reasons, that NAIH's powers  are insufficient, and thus the Hungarian Government violated the Convention on Human Rights by not providing independent, external supervision in cases of national security data processing.

Secrecy Control Set by the Constitutional Court

The question arises: what procedure would ensure that information classified as 'state secrets' could be accessible?

The Constitutional Court (CC) has already dealt with classified information cases in which it examined what procedure could ensure that public interest information cannot be arbitrarily concealed.

The CC found that based on the right of access to information, direct and substantive control over classification must be ensured. This control must be suitable for checking not only the adherence to formal and procedural requirements of classification but also for substantive reviewing the justification of the classification, as well as the necessity and proportionality of the restriction of publicity. (Constitutional Court decision 2/2014. (I. 21.), Reasoning: paragraph [54], confirmed by: Constitutional Court decision 4/2015. (II. 13.)). Regarding the classification of personal data, the CC established that protection against arbitrary classification decisions and unjustified (unnecessary and/or disproportionate) restriction of fundamental rights, genuine and effective external control, can only be ensured if the court reviews not only the legal basis for the restriction but also the substantive justification of the decision (Constitutional Court decision 3174/2025. (V. 30.), Reasoning: paragraph [46])

This means that only a procedure that ensures a body independent of the classifier, in this case, the Government, can fully examine the legality of the secrecy complies with the Fundamental Law (the Constitution of Hungary since 2011). However, under current regulations, this is not ensured. As the above cited NAIH report pointed out,

“it is 'incompatible' [with Constitutional Court case law] if the law governs the Authority's procedure in such a way that, for certain data categories, a minister effectively has the final say on whether the data classification is lawful.”

Thus, in K-Monitor's case, it may easily happen that regardless of the NAIH and court procedures, ultimately, Minister Antal Rogán directing the defendant Office,, who is obviously an interested party, will decide whether his own work organization is justifiably maintaining secrecy.

K-Monitor will keep reporting on the lawsuit in 2026.

Translation: Dániel Gonda